We present a new inductive rule for verifying lower bounds on expected values of random variables after execution of probabilistic loops as well as on their expected runtimes. Our rule is simple in the sense that loop body semantics need to be applied only finitely often in order to verify that the candidates are indeed lower bounds. In particular, it is not necessary to find the limit of a sequence as in many previous rules.
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
We study probabilistic programs featuring discrete probabilistic choices as well as unbounded loops. Randomized algorithms are the classical application of such programs. Recently, applications in biology, quantum computing, cyber security, machine learning, and artificial intelligence led to rapidly growing interest in probabilistic programming [Gordon et al. 2014] .
Formal verification of probabilistic programs is strictly harder than for nonprobabilistic programs . Given a random variable , a key verification task is to reason about the expected value of after termination of a program on input . If is the indicator function of an event , then this expected value is the probability that has occurred on termination of .
For verifying probabilistic loops, most approaches share a common, conceptually very simple, technique: an induction rule for verifying upper bounds on expected values, which are characterized as least fixed points (lfp) of a suitable function Φ. This rule, called łPark inductionž, reads
i.e., for a candidate upper bound we check Φ( ) ⊑ (for a suitable partial order ⊑) to prove that is indeed an upper bound on the least fixed point, and hence on the soughtśafter expected value.
For lower bounds, a simple proof principle analogous to Park induction, namely
is unsound in general. Sound rules (see Sect. 9), on the other hand, often suffer from the fact that either needs to be bounded, or that one has to find the limit of some sequence, as well as the sequence itself, rendering those rules conceptually much more involved than Park induction. Our main contribution (Sect. 5, Thm. 37) is to provide relatively simple side conditions that can be added to the (unsound) implication above, such that the implication becomes true, i.e., ⊑ Φ( ) ∧ some side conditions implies ⊑ lfp Φ .
✓
In particular, our side conditions will be simple in the sense that (a variation of) Φ needs to be applied to a candidate only a finite number of times, which is beneficial for potential automation.
The need for verifying lower bounds on expected values is quite natural: First of all, they help to assess the quality and tightness of upper bounds. Moreover, giving total correctness guarantees for probabilistic programs amounts to lowerśbounding the correctness probability, e.g., in order to establish membership in complexity classes like RP and PP.
In addition to expected values of random variables at program termination, lower bounds on expected runtimes are also of significant interest: Lower bounds on expected runtimes which depend on secret program variables may compromise the secret, thus allowing for timing sideśchannel attacks; łvery largež lower bounds could indicate potential denialśofśservice attacks.
In order to enable practicable reasoning about lower bounds on expected runtimes, we will show how our inductive lower bound rule carries over to expected runtimes (Sect. 8, Thm. 46) . As an example to show the applicability of our rule, we will verify that the wellśknown and notoriously difficult coupon collector's problem [Motwani and Raghavan 1995] has an expected runtime of at least H , where H is the -th harmonic number.
Our new inductive rules will be stated in terms of soścalled expectation transformers [McIver and Morgan 2005] (Sect. 2) and rely on the notions of uniform integrability (Sect. 3, in particular 3.4, and Sect. 4), martingales, conditional difference boundedness, and the Optional Stopping Theorem (Sect. 5) from the theory of stochastic processes. However, we do not only make use of these notions in order to prove soundness of our induction rule, but instead establish tight connections in terms of these notions between expectation transformers and certain canonical stochastic processes (Sect. 4, Thm. 25 and Sect. 5, Thm. 36) . In particular, we will build upon the key result of this connection (Thm. 25) to study exactly how inductive proof rules for both upper and lower bounds can be understood in the realm of these stochastic processes and vice versa (Sect. 5, Thm. 37 and Sect. 7). We see those connections between the theories of expectation transformers and stochastic processes as a stepping stone for applying further results from stochastic process theory to probabilistic program analysis and possibly also vice versa.
As a final contribution, we revisit one of the few existing rules for lower bounds due to [McIver and Morgan 2005] , which gives sufficient criteria for a candidate being a lower bound on the expected value of a bounded function . We show that their rule is also a consequence of uniform integrability and we are moreover able to generalize their rule to a necessary and sufficient criterion (Sect. 6, Thm. 41) . We demonstrate the usability of our generalization by an example (Sect. 6, Ex. 42) .
We refer to [Hark et al. 2019 ] for more case studies illustrating the effectiveness of our lower bound proof rule, a more detailed introduction to probability theory, and more detailed proofs of our results.
WEAKEST PREEXPECTATION REASONING
Weakest preexpectations for probabilistic programs are a generalization of Dijkstra's weakest preconditions for nonprobabilistic programs. Dijkstra employs predicate transformers, which push a postcondition (a predicate) backward through a nonprobabilistic program and yield the weakest precondition (another predicate) describing the largest set of states such that whenever is started in a state satisfying , terminates in a state satisfying . 2 The weakest preexpecation calculus on the other hand employs expectation transformers which act on realśvalued functions called expectations, mapping program states to nonśnegative reals. 3 These transformers push a postexpectation backward through a probabilistic program and yield a preexpectation , such that represents the expected value of after executing . The term expectation coined by [McIver and Morgan 2005] may appear somewhat misleading at first. We clearly distinguish between expectations and expected values: An expectation is hence not an expected value, per se. Instead, we can think of an expectation as a random variable. In Bayesian network jargon, expectations are also called factors. The set of expectations, denoted by F, is defined as
We say that ∈ F is finite and write ≺≺ ∞, if ( ) < ∞ for all ∈ Σ. A partial order ⪯ on F is obtained by pointświse lifting the usual order ≤ on R ≥0 , i.e.,
(F, ⪯) is a complete lattice where suprema and infima are constructed pointświse.
We note that our notion of expectations is more general than the one of McIver 
Weakest Preexpectations
Given program and postexpectation ∈ F, we are interested in the expected value of evaluated in the final states reached after termination of . More specifically, we are interested in a function : Σ → R ≥0 mapping each initial state 0 of to the respective expected value of evaluated in the final states reached after termination of on input 0 . This function is called the weakest preexpectation of with respect to , denoted wp ( ). Put as an equation, if 0 is the probability (sub)measure 5 over final states reached after termination of on initial state 0 , then 6
While wp ( ) in fact represents an expected value, itself does not. In an analogy to Dijkstra's preś and postconditions, as is evaluated in the final states after termination of it is called the postexpectation, and as wp ( ) is evaluated in the initial states of it is called the preexpectation.
The Weakest Preexpectation Calculus
We now show how to determine weakest preexpectations in a systematic and compositional manner by recapitulating the weakest preexpectation calculus à la McIver and Morgan. This calculus employs expectation transformers which move backward through the program in a continuationśpassing style, see Fig. 1 . If we are interested in the expected value of some postexpectation after executing the sequential composition 1 2 , then we can first determine the weakest preexpectation of 2 with respect to , i.e., wp 2 ( ). Thereafter, we can use the intermediate result wp 2 ( ) as postexpectation to determine the weakest preexpectation of 1 with respect to wp 2 ( ). Overall, this gives the weakest preexpectation of 1 2 with respect to the postexpectation . The above explanation illustrates the compositional nature of the weakest preexpectation calculus. wpśtransformers for all language constructs can be defined by induction on the program structure:
Definition 2 (The wpśTransformer [McIver and Morgan 2005] ). Let pGCL be the set of programs in the probabilistic guarded command language. Then the weakest preexpectation transformer wp : pGCL → F → F 5 0 ( ) ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that is the final state reached after termination of on input 0 . We have ∈Σ 0 ( ) ≤ 1, where the łmissingž probability mass is the probability of nontermination of on 0 . 6 As Σ is countable, the integral can be expressed as ∈Σ 0 ( ) · ( ). 
is defined according to the rules given in the characteristic function of while ( ) { } with respect to . Its least fixed point is understood in terms of ⪯. To increase readability, we omit wp, , , or from Φ whenever they are clear from the context.
Example 3 (Applying the wp Calculus). Consider the probabilistic program given by
Suppose we want to know the expected value of after execution of . For this, we determine wp ( ). Using the annotation style shown in Fig. 2a , we can annotate the program as shown in Fig. 2b , using the rules from Table 1 . At the top, we read off the weakest preexpectation of with respect to , namely 4 5 + 6. This tells us that the expected value of after termination of on 0 is equal to 4· 0 ( ) 5 + 6.
The wpśtransformer satisfies what is sometimes called healthiness conditions [Hino et al. 2016; Keimel 2015; McIver and Morgan 2005] 
BOUNDS ON WEAKEST PREEXPECTATIONS
For loopśfree programs, it is generally straightforward to determine weakest preexpectations, simply by applying the rules in Table 1 , which guide us along the syntax of , see Ex. 3. Weakest preexpectations of loops, on the other hand, are generally nonścomputable least fixed points and we often have to content ourselves with some approximation of those fixed points.
For us, a sound approximation is either a lower or an upper bound on the least fixed point. There are in principle two challenges: (1) finding a candidate bound and (2) verifying that the candidate is indeed an upper or lower bound. In this paper, we study the latter problem.
Upper Bounds
The Park induction principle provides us with a very convenient proof rule for verifying upper bounds. In general, this principle reads as follows:
Theorem 5 (Park Induction [Park 1969]) . Let ( , ⊑) be a complete lattice and let Φ : → be continuous. 8 Then Φ has a least fixed point in and for any ∈ ,
In the realm of weakest preconditions, Park induction gives rise to the following induction principle:
Corollary 6 (Park Induction for wp [Kaminski 2019; Kozen 1985] ). Let Φ be the characteristic function of the while loop while ( ) { } with respect to postexpectation and let ∈ F. Then
We call an that satisfies Φ ( ) ⪯ a superinvariant. The striking power of Park induction is its simplicity: Once an appropriate candidate is found (even though this is usually not an easy task), all we have to do is push it through the characteristic function Φ once and check whether we went down in our underlying partial order. If this is the case, we have verified that is indeed an upper bound on the least fixed point and thus on the soughtśafter weakest preexpectation.
Example 7 (Induction for Upper Bounds). Consider the program geo , given by
where we assume ∈ N. Suppose we aim at an upper bound on the expected value of executing geo . Using the annotation style of Fig. 3a , we can annotate the loop geo as shown in Fig. 3b 
For making a comparison to the lower bound case which we consider later, let us explain why Park induction is sound using the soścalled TarskiśKantorovich Principle:
(see Fig. 2a ) Fig. 2a ) wp ′ (see Fig. 2a )
Body } (meaning we employ invariant ) (postexpectation of loop is ) (a) Annotation style for loops using invariants. 
For reasoning about lower bounds, we will later employ ⊲⊳ = ⪰.
Theorem 8 (TarskiśKantorovich Principle, cf. [Jachymski et al. 2000] ). Let ( , ⊑) be a complete lattice, let Φ : → be continuous, and let ∈ , such that ⊒ Φ( ). Then the sequence ⊒ Φ( ) ⊒ Φ 2 ( ) ⊒ Φ 3 ( ) ⊒ · · · is a descending chain that converges to an element
which is a fixed point of Φ. In particular, Φ ( ) is the greatest fixed point of Φ that is ⊑ . Dually, now let ⊑ Φ( ). Then ⊑ Φ( ) ⊑ Φ 2 ( ) ⊑ Φ 3 ( ) ⊑ · · · is an ascending chain that converges to a fixed point Φ ( ) ∈ . Moreover, Φ ( ) is the least fixed point of Φ that is ⊒ .
The wellśknown Kleene Fixed Point Theorem (cf. [Lassez et al. 1982] ), which states that lfp Φ = Φ (⊥), where ⊥ is the least element of , is a special case of the TarskiśKantorovich Principle.
In our setting, applying the TarskiśKantorovich principle to a superinvariant , the iteration of Φ on will yield some fixed point ⊑ and this fixed point is necessarily ⊒ lfp Φ.
Lower Bounds
For verifying lower bounds, we do not have a rule as simple as Park induction available. In particular, for a given complete lattice ( , ⊑) and monotonic function Φ : → , the rule
is unsound in general. We call an satisfying ⊑ Φ( ) a subinvariant and the above rule simple lower induction. Generally, we will call an that is a subś or a superinvariant an invariant. being an invariant thus expresses mainly its inductive nature, namely that is comparable with Φ( ) with respect to the partial order ⊑. An explanation why simple lower induction is unsound is as follows: By Thm. 8, we know from ⊑ Φ( ) that Φ ( ) is the least fixed point of Φ that is greater than or equal to . Since Φ ( ) is a fixed point, Φ ( ) ⊑ gfp Φ holds, but we do not know how compares to lfp Φ. We only know that if indeed ⊑ lfp Φ and ⊑ Φ( ), then iterating Φ on also converges to lfp Φ, i.e.,
If, however, ⊑ Φ( ) and is strictly greater than lfp Φ, then iterating Φ on will yield a fixed point strictly greater than lfp Φ, contradicting soundness of simple lower induction. While we just illustrated by means of the TarskiśKantorovich principle why the simple lower induction rule is not sound in general, we should note that the rule is not per se absurd: So called metering functions [Frohn et al. 2016] basically employ simple lower induction to verify lower bounds on runtimes of nonprobabilistic programs [Kaminski 2019, Thm. 7.18] . For weakest preexpectations, however, simple lower induction is unsound:
Counterexample 9 (Simple Induction for Lower Bounds). Consider the following loop cex ,
In particular, this weakest preexpectation is independent of . The corresponding characteristic function is
Let us consider
i.e., ′ is a subinvariant. If the simple lower induction rule were sound, we would immediately conclude that ′ is a lower bound on wp cex ( ), but this is obviously false since
Problem Statement
The purpose of this paper is to present a sound lower induction rule of the following form: Let Φ be the characteristic function of while ( ) { } with respect to and let ∈ F. Then
We still want our lower induction rule to be simple in the sense that checking the side conditions should be conceptually as simple as checking ⪯ Φ ( ). Intuitively, we want to apply the semantics of the loop body only finitely often, not times, to avoid reasoning about limits of sequences or anything alike. We provide such side conditions in our main contribution, Thm. 37, which transfers the Optional Stopping Theorem of probability theory to weakest preexpectation reasoning.
Uniform Integrability
We now present a sufficient and necessary criterion to underśapproximate the least fixed points that we seek for. Let again Φ be the characteristic function of while ( ) { } with respect to . Thm. 4 implies that Φ is continuous and monotonic. Let us consider a subinvariant , i.e., ⪯ Φ ( ). If we iterate Φ on ad infinitum, then the TarskiśKantorovich principle (Thm. 8) guarantees that we will converge to some fixed point Φ ( ) that is ⪰ . From monotonicity of Φ and Thm. 8, one can easily show that Φ ( ) coincides with lfp Φ if and only if itself was already ⪯ lfp Φ , i.e.:
Theorem 10 (Subinvariance and Lower Bounds). For any subinvariant , we have
More generally, for any expectation (not necessarily a sub-or superinvariant), if iterating Φ on converges to the least fixed point of Φ , then we call uniformly integrable for :
So far, we have thus established the following diagram which we will gradually extend over the next two sections:
Thm. 10 and Def. 11
Uniform integrability [Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001 ] Ð a notion originally from probability theory Ð will be essential for the Optional Stopping Theorem in Sect. 5. While, so far, we have studied the function Φ solely from an expectation transformer point of view and defined a purely expectationś theoretical notion of uniform integrability without any reference to probability theory, we will study in Sect. 4 the function Φ from a stochastic process point of view. Stochastic processes are not inductive per se, whereas expectation transformers make heavy use of induction. We will, however, rediscover the inductiveness also in the realm of stochastic processes. We will also see how our notion of uniform integrability corresponds to uniform integrability in its original sense.
FROM EXPECTATIONS TO STOCHASTIC PROCESSES
In this section, we connect concepts from expectation transformers with notions from probability theory. In Sect. 4.1, we recapitulate standard constructions of probability spaces for probabilistic programs, instantiate them in our setting, and present our new results on connecting expectation transformers with stochastic processes (Sect. 4.2) and uniform integrability (Sect. 4.3). Proofs can be found in [Hark et al. 2019, App. C] . For further background on probability theory, we refer to [Hark et al. 2019, App . B] and [Bauer 1971; Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001] . We fix for this section an arbitrary loop while ( ) { }. The loop body may contain loops but we require to be universally almostśsurely terminating (AST), i.e., terminates on any input with probability 1. The set of program states can be uniquely partitioned into Σ = Σ ⊎ Σ ¬ , with ∈ Σ iff |= . The set Σ ¬ thus contains the terminal states from which the loop is not executed further.
Canonical Probability Space
We begin with constructing a canonical probability measure and space corresponding to the execution of our loop. As every pGCL program is, operationally, a countable Markov chain, our construction is similar to the standard construction for Markov chains (cf. [Vardi 1985] ).
In general, a measurable space is a pair (Ω, ) consisting of a sample space Ω and a śfield of Ω, which is a collection of subsets of Ω, closed under complement and countable union, such that Ω ∈ . In our setting, a loop while ( ) { } induces the following canonical measurable space:
, it is the set of all infinite sequences of program states (soścalled runs). For ∈ Ω loop , we denote by [ ] the śth state in the sequence (starting to count at 0). The śfield loop is the smallest śfield that contains all cylinder sets
Intuitively, a run ∈ Ω is an infinite sequence of states = 0 1 2 3 · · · , where 0 represents the initial state on which the loop is started and is a state that could be reached after iterations of the loop. Obviously, some sequences in Ω loop may not actually be admissible by our loop. We next develop a canonical probability measure corresponding to the execution of the loop, which will assign the measure 0 to inadmissible runs. We start with considering a single loop iteration. The loop body induces a family of distributions 9
where ( ′ ) is the probability that after one iteration of on , the program is in state ′ . The loop while ( ) { } induces a family of probability measures on (Ω loop , loop ). This family is parameterized by the initial state of the loop. Using the distributions • above, we first define the probability of a finite nonśempty prefix of a run, i.e., for ∈ Σ + . Here, ( ) is the probability that is the sequence of states reached after the first loop iterations, when starting the loop in state . Hence, the family
Using the family • , we now obtain a canonical probability measure on the loop space.
Lemma 13 (Loop Measure [Feller 1971, Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem] ). There exists a unique family of probability measures
We now turn to random variables and their expected values. A mapping :
10 If takes only countably many values we have
We saw that while ( ) { } gives rise to a unique canonical measurable space (Ω loop , loop ) and to a family of probability measures P parameterized by the initial state on which our loop is started. We now define a corresponding parameterized expected value operator • E. 
Next, we define a random variable that corresponds to the number of iterations that our loop makes until it terminates.
Definition 15 (Looping Time). The mapping The canonical śfield loop contains infinite runs. But after iterations of the loop we only know the first + 1 states 0 · · · of a run. Gaining knowledge in this successive fashion can be captured by a soścalled filtration of the śfield loop . In general, a filtration is a sequence ( ) ∈N of subsets of , such that ⊆ +1 and is a śfield for any ∈ N, i.e., is approximated from below.
Next, we recall the notion of stopping times from probability theory.
Let us reconsider the looping time ¬ and the loop filtration ( loop ) ∈N . In order to decide for a run = 0 1 · · · ∈ Ω loop whether its looping time is , we only need to consider the states 0 · · · . Hence, ( ¬ ) −1 ({ }) ∈ loop for any ∈ N and thus ¬ is a stopping time with respect to ( loop ) ∈N .
Note that ¬ does not reflect the actual runtime of while ( ) { }, as it does not take the runtime of the loop body into account. Instead, ¬ only counts the number of loop iterations of the łouter loopž while ( ) { }. This enriches the class of probabilistic programs our technique will be able to analyze, as we will not need to require that the whole program has finite expected runtime, but only that the outer loop is expected to be executed finitely often.
Canonical Stochastic Process
Now we can present our novel results on the connection of weakest preexpectations and stochastic processes. Henceforth, let , ∈ F. Intuitively, will play the role of the postexpectation and the role of an invariant (i.e., is a subś or superinvariant). We now present a canonical stochastic process, i.e., a sequence of random variables that captures approximating wp while ( ) { } ( ) using the invariant .
Definition 18 (Induced Stochastic Process). The stochastic process induced by , denoted X , = ( , ) ∈N , is given by
otherwise .
11 Note that here loop = ∈N loop which is not the case for general filtrations.
Now, in what sense does the stochastic process X , capture approximating the weakest preexpectation of our loop with respect to by invariant ? , takes as argument a run of the loop and assigns to a value as follows: If the loop has reached a terminal state within iterations, it returns the value of the postexpectation evaluated in that terminal state. If no such terminal state is reached within steps, it simply approximates the remainder of the run, i.e.,
by returning the value of the invariant evaluated in [ +1] . We see that , needs at most the first + 2 states of a run to determine its value. Thus, , is not śmeasurable but +1 śmeasurable, as there exist runs that agree on the first + 1 states but yield different images under , . Hence, we shift the loop filtration ( loop ) ∈N by one.
Definition 19 (Shifted Loop Filtration). The filtration ( loop ) ∈N of loop is defined by
The loop space, the loop measure, and the induced stochastic process X , are not defined by induction on the number of steps performed in the program. The loop space, for instance, contains all infinite sequences of states, whether they are admissible by the loop or not. The loop measure filters out the inadmissible runs and gives them probability 0.
Reasoning by invariants and characteristic functions, on the other hand, is inductive. We will thus relate iterating a characteristic function on to the stochastic process X , . For this, let Φ again be the characteristic function of while ( ) { } with respect to , i.e.,
We now develop a first connection between the stochastic process X , and Φ , which involves the notion of conditional expected values with respect to a śfield, for which we provide some preliminaries here. In general, for ⊆ Ω, by slight abuse of notation, the Iverson bracket [ ] : Ω → R ≥0 maps ∈ Ω to 1 if ∈ and to 0 otherwise. [ ] is śmeasurable iff ∈ . If is a random variable on (Ω, , P) and ⊆ is a śfield with respect to Ω, then the conditional expected value E ( | ) : Ω → R ≥0 is a śmeasurable mapping such that for every ∈ the equality E ( · [ ]) = E (E ( | ) · [ ]) holds, i.e., restricted to the set the conditional expected value E ( | ) and have the same expected value. Hence, E ( | ) is a random variable that is like , but for elements that are indistinguishable in the subfield , i.e., they either are both contained or none of them is contained in a śmeasurable set, it łdistributes the value of equallyž.
Theorem 21 (Relating X , and ). For any ∈ N and any ∈ Σ, we have
Note that both sides in Thm. 21 are mappings of type Ω loop → R ≥0 . Intuitively, Thm. 21 expresses the following: Consider some cylinder ( ) ∈ loop , i.e., = 0 · · · +1 ∈ Σ +2 is a sequence of states of length + 2. Then, ,Φ ( ) and
, +1 have the same expected value under P on the cylinder set ( ) independent of the initial state of the loop. Using Thm. 21, one can now explain in which way iterating Φ on represents an expected value, thus revealing the inductive structure inside the induced stochastic process:
Corollary 22 (Relating Expected Values of X , and Iterations of ). For any ∈ N and any ∈ Σ, we have
Intuitively, Φ +1 represents allowing for at most + 1 evaluations of the loop guard. For any state ∈ Σ, the number Φ +1 ( )( ) is composed of (a) 's average value on the final states of those runs starting in that terminate within + 1 guard evaluations, and (b) 's average value on the ( + 2)śnd states of those runs starting in that do not terminate within + 1 guard evaluations. We now want to take to the limit by considering all possible numbers of iterations of the loop body. We will see that this corresponds to evaluating the stochastic process X , at the time when our loop terminates, i.e., the looping time ¬ :
Definition 23 (Canonical Stopped Process). The mapping
is the stopped process, corresponding to X , stopped at stopping time ¬ . As this mapping is independent of , we write ¬ instead of , ¬ . The stopped process now corresponds exactly to the quantity we want to reason about Ð the value of evaluated in the final state after termination of our loop. For nonterminating runs we get 0, as there exists no state in which to evaluate . We now show that the limit of the induced stochastic process X , corresponds to the stopped process ¬ . For the following lemma, note that a statement over runs holds almostśsurely in the probability space (Ω loop , loop , P), if P ({ ∈ Ω | satisfies }) = 1, i.e., the set of all elements of the sample space satisfying has probability 1.
Lemma 24 (Convergence of X , to ¬ ). The stochastic process X , · ( ¬ ) −1 (N) converges pointświse to ¬ , i.e., for all ∈ Ω loop ,
So if while ( ) { } is universally almostśsurely terminating, then X , converges to ¬ almostś surely with respect to the measure P for any ∈ Σ.
Intuitively, the factor ( ¬ ) −1 (N) ( ) selects those runs where the looping time ¬ is finite. If the loop is AST, then this factor can be neglected, because then ( ¬ ) −1 (N) is the constant function 1 for the probability measures P. In any case, (i.e., whether the looping time is almostś surely finite or not) the expected value of the stopped process captures precisely the weakest preexpectation of our loop with respect to the postexpectation , since only the terminating runs are taken into account by ¬ and by lfp Φ when computing the expected value of after termination of the loop. So from Cor. 22 and Lem. 24 we get our first main result:
Theorem 25 (Weakest Preexpectation is Expected Value of Stopped Process).
Thm. 25 captures our soughtśafter least fixed point as an expected value of a canonical stopped process. This is what will allow us to later apply the Optional Stopping Theorem. Moreover, it is crucial for deriving our generalization of an existing rule for lower bounds (cf. Sect. 6) and the connection of upper bounds to the Lemma of Fatou (cf. Sect. 7).
Uniform Integrability
As we will see in Sect. 5, uniform integrability of a certain stochastic process is the central aspect of the Optional Stopping Theorem (Thm. 31). In probability theory, uniform integrability means that taking the expected value and taking the limit of a stochastic process commutes. 
Note that our notion of uniform integrability of expectations from Def. 11 coincides with uniform integrability of the corresponding induced stochastic process.
Corollary 28 (Uniform Integrability of Expectations and Stochastic Processes). Let the loop while ( ) { } be AST. 12 Then is uniformly integrable for (in the sense of Def. 11) iff the induced stochastic process X , is uniformly integrable (in the sense of Def. 26), i.e.,
Cor. 28 justifies the naming in Def. 11: an expectation is uniformly integrable for iff its induced process X , is uniformly integrable. So, we can now extend the diagram from Sect. 3.4 as follows:
Lem. 24 and Def. 26
Cor. 22 and Thm. 25
Def. 11
Uniform integrability is very hard to verify in general, both in the realm of stochastic processes as well as in the realm of expectation transformers. Thus, one usually tries to find sufficient criteria for uniform integrability that are easier to verify. The very idea of the Optional Stopping Theorem is to provide such sufficient criteria for uniform integrability which then allow deriving a lower bound as we will discuss in the next section.
THE OPTIONAL STOPPING THEOREM OF WEAKEST PREEXPECTATIONS
In this section, we develop an inductive proof rule for lower bounds on preexpectations by using the results of Sect. 4 and the Optional Stopping Theorem (Thm. 31). The proofs of our results in this section can be found in [Hark et al. 2019, App. D] . Recall that we have fixed a loop while ( ) { }, a finite postexpectation , a corresponding characteristic function Φ , and another finite expectation which plays the role of an invariant. We first introduce the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory. It builds upon the concept of submartingales. A submartingale is a stochastic process that induces a monotonically increasing sequence of its expected values.
Definition 29 (Submartingale). Let ( ) ∈N be a stochastic process on a probability space (Ω, , P) adapted to a filtration ( ) ∈N of , i.e., a sequence of random variables : Ω → R ≥0 such that is śmeasurable. Then ( ) ∈N is called a submartingale with respect to ( ) ∈N if
It turns out that submartingales are closely related to subinvariants. In fact, being a subinvariant (plus some side conditions) gives us that the stochastic process induced by is a submartingale.
Lemma 30 (Subinvariant Induces Submartingale). Let be a subinvariant, i.e., ⪯ Φ ( ), such that Φ ( ) ≺≺ ∞ for every ∈ N, that is, Φ ( ) only takes finite values. Then the induced stochastic process X , is a submartingale with respect to ( loop ) ∈N .
Given a submartingale ( ) ∈N and a stopping time , the goal of the Optional Stopping Theorem is to prove a lower bound for the expected value of at the stopping time . To this end, we define a stochastic process ( ∧ ) ∈N where for any ∈ Ω, ∧ ( ) = ( ) if is smaller than the stopping time ( ) and otherwise, ∧ ( ) = ( ) ( ). Hence, E (lim → ∧ ) is the expected value of at the stopping time . The Optional Stopping Theorem asserts that the first component 0 of the stochastic process ( ) ∈N is a lower bound for E (lim → ∧ ) provided that ( ∧ ) ∈N is uniformly integrable. Moreover, the Optional Stopping Theorem provides a collection of criteria that are sufficient for uniform integrability of ( ∧ ) ∈N .
Theorem 31 (Optional Stopping Theorem [Grimmett and Stirzaker 2001, Theorems 12.3. (1), 12.4.(11), 12.5.(1), 12.5.(2), 12.5.(9)]). Let ( ) ∈N be a submartingale and be a stopping time on a probability space (Ω, , P) with respect to a filtration ( ) ∈N . Then X ∧ = ( ∧ ) ∈N defined by
is also a submartingale w.r.t. ( ) ∈N . If X ∧ converges almostśsurely and is uniformly integrable,
If one of the following conditions holds, then X ∧ converges almostśsurely and is uniformly integrable: (a) is almostśsurely bounded, i.e., there is a constant ∈ N such that P ( ≤ ) = 1. (b) E ( ) < ∞ and there is a constant ∈ R ≥0 , such that for each ∈ N E (| +1 − | | ) ≤ holds almostśsurely .
(c) There exists a constant ∈ R ≥0 such that ∧ ≤ holds almostśsurely for every ∈ N.
Our goal now is to transfer the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory to the realm of weakest preexpectations in order to obtain inductive proof rules for lower bounds on weakest preexpectations. So far, we have introduced the looping time ¬ (which is a stopping time w.r.t.
( loop ) ∈N ), presented the connection of subinvariants and submartingales, and defined the concept of uniform integrability also for expectations. Hence, the only missing ingredient is a proper connection of expectations to the condition łE (| +1 − | | ) ≤ ž in Thm. 31 (b). To translate this concept to expectations, we require that the expectation has a certain shape depending on the postexpectation .
Definition 32 (Harmonization). An expectation harmonizes with ∈ F if it is of the form
for some expectation ′ ∈ F.
Def. 32 reflects that in terminal states of the loop the invariant evaluates to ( ). For an invariant to harmonize with postexpectation is a minor restriction on the shape of . It is usually easy to choose an that takes the value of for states in which the loop is not executed at all. Moreover, performing one iteration of Φ obviously brings any expectation łinto shapež:
Corollary 33 (Harmonizing Expectations). For any , ∈ F, Φ ( ) harmonizes with .
The actual criterion that connects łE (| +1 − | | ) ≤ ž with the invariant is called conditional difference boundedness (see also [Fioriti and Hermanns 2015; ):
Definition 34 (Conditional Difference Boundedness). Let ∈ F. We define the function : F → F and the expectation Δ ∈ F as 13 Example 35. Reconsider the program cex from Counterex. 9 and expectation = + [ ≠ 0]. We will check conditional difference boundedness of , using the function given by
We then check the following:
. by the constant 1. In contrast, the subinvariant ′ = + [ ≠ 0] · (1 + 2 ) from Counterex. 9 is not conditionally difference bounded. Indeed, we would get (cf. [Hark et al. 2019, App. D] for details)
which cannot be bounded by a constant.
Finally, we can connect the expected change of to a property of the stochastic process X , . This is our second major result.
Theorem 36 (Expected Change of ). Let ≺≺ ∞ harmonize with . Then
The stochastic process X , induced by exhibits an interesting correspondence: If Δ is bounded by a constant (i.e., if is c.d.b.), then so is 0,Δ and thus Thm. 36 ensures that precondition (b) of the Optional Stopping Theorem (Thm. 31) is fulfilled. Note that Thm. 36 depends crucially on the fact that ≺≺ ∞ as otherwise the wellśdefinedness of the expectation Δ cannot be ensured. Now Lem. 30 allows us to use the Optional Stopping Theorem from probability theory (Thm. 31) to prove a novel Optional Stopping Theorem for weakest preexpectations, which collects sufficient conditions for uniform integrability. In particular, due to Thm. 36, our Optional Stopping Theorem shows that our notion of conditional difference boundedness is an (easyśtoścheck) sufficient criterion for uniform integrability and hence, for ensuring that a subinvariant is indeed a lower bound for the weakest preexpectation under consideration. After stating the theorem, we will discuss the intuition of its parts in more detail.
Theorem 37 (Optional Stopping Theorem for Weakest Preexpectation Reasoning). Consider a loop while ( ) { } where is AST. Let ≺≺ ∞ be a subinvariant w.r.t. the postexpectation ≺≺ ∞ (i.e., ⪯ Φ ( )). is uniformly integrable for iff is a lower bound, i.e.,
is uniformly integrable for if one of the following three conditions holds: We can now extend the diagram from Sect. 4 connecting the realm of stochastic processes (on the right) and the realm of expectation transformers (on the left) for a universally almostśsurely terminating program. The respective Optional Stopping Theorems provide the sufficient criteria for uniform integrability, which is marked by the dashed implications. [Frohn et al. 2016] for deterministic terminating loops. As for the severity of the finiteness condition łΦ ( ) ≺≺ ∞ for every ∈ Nž, note that if the body is loopśfree, this condition is vacuously satisfied as itself is finite and cannot become infinite by finitely iterations of Φ . If contains loops, then we can establish the finiteness condition by finding a finite superinvariant with ⪯ ≺≺ ∞.
In this case, we can also guarantee Φ ( ) ≺≺ ∞. 14 Case (b) applies whenever the outer loop is expected to be executed finitely often. In particular, this holds if the entire loop terminates positively almostśsurely (i.e., within finite expected runtime).
To the best of our knowledge, Cases (a) and (b) are the first sufficiently simple induction rules for lower bounds that do not require restricting to bounded postexpectations . While the requirements on the loop's termination behavior gradually weaken along (a) → (b) → (c), the requirements on the subinvariant become stricter.
Finally, Case (c) yields an alternative proof of the result of [McIver and Morgan 2005] on inductive lower bounds for bounded expectations in case of AST, which we will generalize in Sect. 6.
When comparing the cases (c) of Thm. 31 and Thm. 37, we notice that Thm. 31 (c) has no restrictions on the stopping time, whereas Thm. 37 (c) requires almostśsure termination. This might spark some hope that AST is not needed in Thm. 37 (c), but the following counterexample shows that this is not the case:
Counterexample 38. Consider the program
together with the bounded postexpectation = 1, i.e., we are interested in the termination probability which is obviously 0. The corresponding characteristic function is given by
i.e., Φ 1 is the identity map. Trivially, the bounded expectation = 1 is a fixed point of Φ 1 , thus in particular is a subinvariant. Clearly, is not a lower bound on the actual termination probability, i.e., on lfp Φ 1 . If the condition of almostśsure termination in Thm. 37 (c) could be weakened, it has to be ensured that for any program while ( ) { } with universally almostśsurely terminating body 15 and postexpectation = 1, 1 is a lower bound only if the program terminates universally almostśsurely. But this means that this property has to be at least as strong as almostśsure termination.
We reconsider Counterex. 9 illustrating unsoundness of simple lower induction and do sound lower induction instead.
Example 39. Let us continue Ex. 35, where we have checked that for the program cex the expectation = + [ ≠ 0] is conditionally difference bounded by 1. It is easy to check that is a fixed point of the characteristic function Φ with respect to the postexpectation , which by Park induction gives us a finite upper bound on the least fixed point of Φ . But up to now we could not prove that is indeed equal to the least fixed point. Using Thm. 37, we can now do this.
First of all, we already have Φ ( ) = ≺≺ ∞ and since is a fixed point, it is also a subinvariant. Secondly, the loop is expected to be executed twice. 16 Finally, = + [ ≠ 0] = [¬( ≠ 0)] · + [ ≠ 0] · ( + 1) harmonizes with and is conditionally difference bounded. Hence, the preconditions of Thm. 37 (b) are satisfied and is indeed a lower bound on lfp Φ . Since is a fixed point, it is the least fixed point, i.e., we have proved wp cex ( ) = .
14 The reason is that by Thm. 8 we have ⪰ Φ ( ) ⪰ Φ ( ) and Φ ( ) ⪰ Φ ( ) ⪰ for all ∈ N. By the monotonicity of Φ (Thm. 4), ⪰ implies Φ ( ) ⪰ Φ ( ), which gives us ∞ ≻≻ ⪰ Φ ( ) ⪰ Φ ( ) ⪰ Φ ( ). 15 Note that in this case 1 is always a subinvariant. 16 Positive almostśsure termination itself can also be verified by Park induction, see [Kaminski et al. 2016 , 2018 .
Further case studies demonstrating the effectiveness of our proof rule, as well as an example that cannot be treated by Thm. 37, are provided in [Hark et al. 2019, App. A] .
LOWER BOUND RULES BY MCIVER AND MORGAN
In Sect. 5, we briefly mentioned the rules for lower bounds for bounded expectations by [McIver and Morgan 2005] which are restated in Thm. 40 below. To the best of our knowledge, before our new Thm. 37 these were the only existing inductive proof rules for weakest preexpectations.
Theorem 40 ([McIver and Morgan 2005] ). Let ∈ F be a bounded postexpectation. Furthermore, let ′ ∈ F be a bounded expectation such that the harmonized expectation ∈ F given by = [¬ ] · + [ ] · ′ is a subinvariant of while ( ) { } with respect to . Finally, let = wp while ( ) { } (1) be the termination probability of while ( ) { }. Then:
(1) If = [ ] for some predicate , then · ⪯ wp while ( ) { } ( ) .
(2) If [ ] ⪯ for some predicate , then [ ] · ⪯ wp while ( ) { } ( ) .
(3) If · ⪯ for some > 0, then ⪯ wp while ( ) { } ( ) .
Thm. 40 does not make any assumptions on the termination behavior of the loop, so, it is also possible to analyze programs with termination probability < 1. It turns out that Thm. 40 (1) ś (3) can be proved easily from our results from Sect. 4 in the case where is AST where we do not need the restriction that harmonizes with . In particular, we can show that in Thm. 40 (3) the fact that is the probability of termination is insignificant (see [Hark et al. 2019, App. E] ). In fact, it suffices if is the weakest preexpectation for some arbitrary bounded postexpectation, i.e., a least fixed point (see [Hark et al. 2019, App . E] for details and proofs). So, we obtain the following generalized version of Thm. 40 (3) in the case where is AST which is substantially more powerful: it states a sufficient condition for a subinvariant to be a lower bound but also a necessary condition. This is the main new contribution of this section.
Theorem 41 (Generalization of Thm. 40 (3)). Let ∈ F be a bounded postexpectation. Furthermore, let ∈ F be a bounded expectation such that is a subinvariant of while ( ) { } with respect to where is AST. There exist > 0 and ∈ F bounded s.t. Example 42. Let us consider the program rdw for an asymmetric random walk
with , ∈ N and ≤ 100. This program is not AST but the body of the loop is indeed AST. Furthermore, the postexpectation is bounded. If ≤ initially then is 0 after termination of the program. So, wp rdw ( ) ≥ [ > ] · 1 3 · ( − ) ≔ . Now consider = [ even] · 200 · 2 + [ odd] · ( + 5) 4 . We have ′ ≤ Φ ( ′ ), where ′ = 400 · (see [Hark et al. 2019, App. E] ). As we have 1 400 · ′ ≤ wp rdw ( ) we can conclude from Thm. 41 that ′ ≤ wp rdw ( ). Note that this is easier than relating ′ and the termination probability as required by Thm. 40 since the probability of termination of the loop is independent of .
Of course, Ex. 42 is an artifical example. Nevertheless, it shows a strength of our generalisation: it makes it easier to reason about bounded expectations which are independent of the probability of termination. However, a drawback of Thm. 40 remains: one already needs a lower bound, i.e., one has to be able to read off a lower bound directly from the program.
UPPER BOUNDS AND FATOU'S LEMMA
We saw that Park induction for proving upper bounds does not require additional conditions such as conditional difference boundedness or even boundedness of or , respectively. The question arises whether this fact is also explainable using our canonical stochastic process. Indeed, the wellśknown Lemma of Fatou provides such an explanation. We will present a specialized variant of it which is sufficient for our purpose.
Lemma 43 (Fatou's Lemma (cf. [Bauer 1971, Lemma 2.7 .1])). Let ( ) ∈N be a stochastic process on a probability space (Ω, , P). Then
so is indeed an upper bound on the least fixed point. Note that here we handle arbitrary loops, i.e., they are not necessarily AST. While being a superinvariant (plus some side conditions) still implies that X , is a supermartingale, the second part of Lem. 24 is not applicable, i.e., in general we have ¬ ≠ lim → , if the loop is not AST. So in this case we cannot use classic results from martingale theory. Nevertheless, Fatou's Lemma combined with Thm. 25 and the first part of Lem. 24 provide a connection of Park induction for upper bounds to stochastic processes.
LOWER BOUNDS ON THE EXPECTED RUNTIME
So far, we have developed techniques for verifying lower bounds on weakest preexpectations, i.e., expected values of random variables upon program termination. In this section, we transfer 
those techniques to verify lower bounds on expected runtimes of probabilistic programs. For this, we employ the ertśtransformer , which is very similar to the wptransformer: Given program and postruntime ∈ F, we are interested in the expected time it takes to first execute and then let time pass (where is evaluated in the final states reached after termination of ). Again, the behavior (and the runtime) of depends on its input, so we are actually interested in a function ∈ F mapping initial states 0 to the respective expected time. For more details, see also [Kaminski 2019, Chapter 7] . Similarly to weakest preexpectations, expected runtimes can be determined in a systematic and compositional manner by means of the ert calculus:
Definition 44 (The ertśTransformer ). Let pGCL be again the set of programs in the probabilistic guarded command language. Then the expected runtime transformer ert : pGCL → F → F is defined according to the rules given in Table 2 . We call the function Φ ert ⟨ , ⟩ the ertścharacteristic function of the loop while ( ) { } with respect to . Its least fixed point is understood in terms of the partial order ⪯. To increase readability, we will again usually omit ert, , , or from Φ whenever they are clear from the context.
Example 45 (Applying the ert Calculus). Consider the probabilistic program given by
Suppose we want to know the expected runtime of . Then we need to determine ert (0). Reusing the annotation styles of Fig. 2a for wp, we make the following ert annotations: At the top, we read off the expected runtime of , namely 4 + [ ≠ 5] · 4 5 . This tells us that the expected runtime of is 4 if started in an initial state where is 5, and 4 + 4 5 = 24 5 otherwise. The ertś and the wpśtransformers are not only similar in definition, but they are closely connected by the following equality :
In addition, reasoning about upper bounds by Park induction works exactly the same way. For reasoning about lower bounds using subinvariants, notice above that ert (0) is independent of . So, we can combine our derivation of Thm. 37 for lower bounds on wp in Sect. 4 and 5 with the equation above to establish the first inductive rule for verifying lower bounds on expected runtimes:
Theorem 46 (Inductive Lower Bounds on Expected Runtimes). Let , ∈ F with , ≺≺ ∞ and let harmonize with . Furthermore, let ert Φ be the ertścharacteristic function of the loop while ( ) { } with respect to . If is conditionally difference bounded and wp Φ ( ) ≺≺ ∞, then
We call an that satisfies ⪯ ert Φ ( ) a runtime subinvariant.
The proof of Thm. 46 can be found in [Hark et al. 2019, App. F.1] . We now illustrate the applicability of Thm. 46:
Example 47 (Coupon Collector [Pólya 1930]) . Consider the wellśknown coupon collector's problem: There are different types coupons. A collector wants to collect at least one of each type. Each time she buys a new coupon, its type is drawn uniformly at random. How many coupons does she (expectedly) need to buy in order to have collected at least one coupon of each type?
We can model this problem by the program cc for some nonśzero natural number ∈ N:
Variable represents the number of uncollected coupon types. The inner loop models the buying of new coupons until an uncollected type is drawn. 17 The expected runtime of cc is proportional to the expected number of coupons the collector needs to buy. We want to prove that H is a lower bound on that expected runtime, where H is the -th harmonic number, i.e., H 0 = 0 and H = =1 1 . For this, we make the following annotations, reusing the annotation style of Fig. 3a (for more detailed annotations, see [Hark et al. 2019, App. F.2] ): [Hark et al. 2019, App. F.2, Lemma 86 
By our above annotations, we have shown that
is indeed a runtime subinvariant of the outer loop. Before we finish proving that is indeed a lower bound on the expected runtime of the outer loop, let us take a closer look at the meaning of : If is a lower bound, the outer loop takes at least expected runtime H if is between 1 and , and expected runtime H + − if is larger than . In the second case, the tooślarge value suggests that we have to collect more coupons than there are different coupons. So we first collect − arbitrary łexcess coupons" before we enter the łnormal coupon collector mode" and collect the remaining coupons in expected time H . Indeed, H (without case analysis) is not a lower bound on the expected runtime and we would in fact fail to prove its subinvariance. For the inner loop, we have used the fact that this loop is a soścalled independent and identically distributed loop, for which exact expected runtimes can be determined [Batz et al. 2018, Theorem 4] . For more details, see [Hark et al. 2019, App. F.2, Lemma 86] . We stress that while in this case we had an exact expected runtime for the inner loop available by external techniques, a suitable underapproximation of the expected runtime of the inner loop using the technique presented in this paper (Thm. 46) would have worked as well. Hence, our technique is generally applicable to nested loops.
At the very top of the above annotations, we push over the initial assignment, thus verifying 1 + H (and hence also H ) as lower bound for the entire expected runtime of cc .
In order to establish that the subinvariant is in fact a lower bound, we are still left to prove conditional difference boundedness of . For this, we first make the following annotations: 
by case analysis)
⪯ 1 2 + Hence, Δ is bounded by a constant, as is constant within the program cc . Finally, we would still have to show wp Φ ( ) ≺≺ ∞, which is easily checked and thus omitted here. This concludes our lower bound proof for the coupon collector's problem.
In the example above, we have verified that H is a lower bound on the expected runtime of the coupon collector program. This lower bound enjoys several nice properties: For one, our lower bound is an exact asymptotic lower bound. Another fact is that our lower bound is a strict lower bound. The actual runtime is a bit higher, as we have omitted some constants. This is, however, a desirable fact, as often we are only interested in the asymptotic runtime and do not wish to bother with the constants. Notice further, that we never had to find the limit of any sequence. Loop semantics (be it wp or ert) were all applied only finitely many times in order to verify a tight asymptotic lower bound. 18 All in all, the above example demonstrates the effectiveness of our inductive lower bound rule.
RELATED WORK
Weakest preexpectation reasoning. The weakest preexpectation calculus goes back to the predicate transformer calculus by [Dijkstra 1975 [Dijkstra , 1976 , which provides an important tool for qualitative formal reasoning about nonprobabilistic programs. The probabilistic and quantitative analog to predicate transformers for nonprobabilistic programs are expectation transformers for probabilistic programs. Weakestśpreexpectationśstyle reasoning was first studied in seminal work on probabilistic propositional dynamic logic (PPDL) by [Kozen 1983 [Kozen , 1985 . Its boxś and diamondśmodalities provide probabilistic versions of Dijkstra's weakest (liberal) preconditions. Amongst others, [Jones 1990 ], , [McIver and Morgan 2005] , and [Hehner 2011] have furthered this line of research, e.g., by considering nondeterminism and proof rules for bounding preexpectations in the presence of loops. Work towards automation of weakest preexpectation reasoning was carried out, amongst others, by [Chen et al. 2015] , [Cock 2014] , [Katoen et al. 2010] , and [Feng et al. 2017 ]. Abstract interpretation of probabilistic programs was studied in this setting by [Monniaux 2005 ].
Bounds on weakest preexpectations. Rules for bounding weakest preexpectations were considered from very early on. Already [Kozen 1983 ] provides an induction rule for verifying upper bounds. Pioneering work on lower bounds by means of limits of sequences was carried out by [Jones 1990] and later reconsidered by [Audebaud and Paulin-Mohring 2009] . Proof rules that do not make use of limits were studied by [Morgan 1996 ] and later more extensively in [McIver and Morgan 2005 ]. An orthogonal approach to lower bounds by means of bounded model checking was explored by [Jansen et al. 2016] .
Advanced weakest preexpectation calculi. Apart from reasoning about expected values of random variables at termination of simple pGCL programs, more advanced expectationśbased calculi were invented. For instance, [Morgan and McIver 1999] use expectation transformers to reason about temporal logic. More recently, ] studies expectation transformers for probabilistic programs with conditioning. introduce expectation based calculi to reason about expected runtimes of probabilistic programs. [Batz et al. 2019 ] present a quantitative separation logic together with a weakest preexpectation calculus for verifying probabilistic programs with pointerśaccess to dynamic memory.
In all of the above works, the rules for lower bounds rely throughout on finding limits of sequences as well as the sequences themselves. In particular, the proof of the (exact) expected runtime of the coupon collector by ] requires a fairly complicated sequence, whereas our invariant in Ex. 47 was conceptually fairly easy and thus more informative for a human.
Martingaleśbased reasoning. Probabilistic program analysis using martingales was pioneered by [Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan 2013] . Our rules rely on the notions of uniform integrability and conditional difference boundedness as well as the Optional Stopping Theorem. Previous works have also used these notions. [Barthe et al. 2016 ] focus on synthesizing exact martingale expressions.
[Fioriti and Hermanns 2015] develop a type system for uniform integrability in order to prove (positive) almostśsure termination 19 of probabilistic programs and give upper bounds on the expected runtime. give lower bounds on expected runtimes. [Kobayashi et al. 2018 ] provide a semiśdecision procedure for lower bounding termination probabilities of probabilistic higherśorder recursive programs. [Ngo et al. 2018 ] perform automated templateś driven resource analysis, but infer upper bounds only.
The latter four works analyze the termination behavior of a probabilistic program, whereas we focus on general expected values, e.g., of program variables. Furthermore, we do not only make use of uniform integrability and/or conditional difference boundedness of some auxiliary stochastic process in order to prove soundness of our proof rules but establish tight connections between expectationśbased reasoning via induction and martingaleśbased reasoning.
Other work on probabilistic program analysis by specialized kinds of martingales includes [Chakarov and Sankaranarayanan 2014] , [Chatterjee et al. 2016] , [Chatterjee et al. 2017] , [Agrawal et al. 2018] , [Huang et al. 2018] , , and [Wang et al. 2019 ]. For instance, regarding expected runtimes of probabilistic (and possibly nondeterministic) programs, construct difference bounded (as opposed to conditionally difference bounded, which is a strictly weaker requirement) supermartingales which have to correspond to the exact asymptotic expected runtime. In contrast, our rule allows for reasoning about strict lower bounds.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied proof rules for lower bounds in probabilistic program verification. Our rules are simple in the sense that the invariants need to be łpushed through the loop semantics" 19 Termination with probability 1 (within finite expected time). only a finite number of times, much like invariants in Hoare logic. In contrast, existing rules for lower bounds of unbounded weakest preexpectations required coming up with an infinite sequence of invariants, performing induction to prove relative inductiveness of two subsequent invariants, and then Ð most unpleasantly Ð finding the limit of this sequence. The main results of this paper are the following:
(1) We have presented the first inductive proof rules (Thm. 37 (a) and (b)) for verifying lower bounds on (possibly unbounded) weakest preexpectations of probabilistic while loops using quantitative invariants. Our inductive rules are given as an Optional Stopping Theorem (OST) for weakest preexpectations. They provide sufficient conditions for the requirement of uniform integrability which are much easier to check than uniform integrability in general. Case studies demonstrating the effectiveness but also the limitations of these rules are found in [Hark et al. 2019 , App. A].
(2) For proving our OST, we resort to the classical OST from probability theory. However, for most notions that appear in the classical OST, like uniform integrability and conditional difference boundedness, we were able to find purely expectationśtransformerśbased counterparts (see Sect. 4 and 5). We thus conjecture that our OST can be proven in purely expectationśtheoretic terms, which would most likely simplify the proof of our OST significantly as no probability theory would be required anymore.
(3) We studied the inductive proof rules for lower bounds on bounded weakest preexpectations from [McIver and Morgan 2005] . Our results gave rise to a generalization of their proof rule to a sufficient and necessary criterion for lower bounds. (Thm. 41). (4) We have investigated a measure theoretical explanation for why verifying upper bounds using domain theoretical Park induction is conceptually simpler (Sect. 7). The underlying reason is the wellśknown Lemma of Fatou. This leads us to speculate that Fatou's Lemma could be proved in purely domain theoretical terms, perhaps as an instance of Park induction. A successful attempt at a similar idea is due to [Baranga 1991 ] who proved that the wellśknown Banach Contraction Principle is a particular instance of the Kleene Fixed Point Theorem. (5) We used the close connection between wp and ert to present the first inductive proof rule for lower bounding expected runtimes (Thm. 46). As an example to demonstrate the power of this rule, we inferred a nontrivial lower bound on the expected runtime of the famous coupon collector's problem (Ex. 47).
Future work includes extending our proof rules for weakest preexpectation reasoning to recursive programs , to probabilistic programs with nondeterminism [McIver and Morgan 2001 Morgan , 2005 , and to mixedśsign postexpectations. For the latter, this will likely yield more appealing proof rules for loops than those provided in [Kaminski and Katoen 2017] which currently involve reasoning about sequences. Moreover, we are interested in (partially) automating the synthesis of the quantitative invariants needed in our proof rules.
